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to my ancestors in 
Bicol(andia) who
cared and still care
for the land 
*
What and who is at risk in 
geothermal energy infrastructure 
development?
Should geothermal energy be 
managed as infrastructure or a 
natural resource? 
Has geothermal energy development 
been an example of “sustainable” 
development?
How do we rethink these projects 
in today’s context of addressing 
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The research and collection of this work took place on the traditional, unceded, 
ancestral territories of the Munsee Lenape, Wappinger, Canarsie, xʷməθkʷəy̓əm 
(Musqueam), Sḵwx̱wú7mesh (Squamish), and səl̓ilwətaɁɬ təməxʷ (Tsleil-Waututh) First 
Nations, where I have occupied the lands of throughout the year of writing 
this thesis. As a second-generation Filipinx-Canadian, the geographic area of 
study is centered in the Philippine archipelago made up of over seven thousand 
islands that have endured the violent displacement of its indigenous inhabitants 
since the early 16th century. Though I have a maternal connection to the Bicol 
Region, specifically Balatan and Nabua in the province of Camarines Sur, I 
acknowledge the outsider voice that I bring to this discourse (especially with 
the limitations of the scope of this study as a historic literature review and 
high level policy analysis)———but position myself as a researcher claiming 
the nuanced genealogical, cultural and political experiences attached to being 
Asian-Canadian-Pacific Islander, and more specifically: a Filipinx femme. The 
semantic use of “Filipinx” is deliberate in this work to create space for all 
gender identities that have been historically excluded and disenfranchised 
in the white-centric places that Filipinx people have emigrated to around 
the world, and owe such articulation to Filipinx-American scholars like Dr. 
Kevin Nadal. “Filipinx/a/o,” modeled after the “Latinx” movement centers the 
experience of the queer Filipinx body and signals towards the decolonization of 
the Filipinx identity which I implore through the practices and teachings of 
Linda Tuhiwai Smith and her book, Decolonizing Methodologies.
This work interrogates the development, particularly in geothermal energy, 
made in the Bicol region in the vain of “sustainability” and “progress,” while 
reckoning with what defines those terms in relation to “value,” “power,” and 
“resiliency.” The Bicolano/Bikolano people are part of the larger threatened 
group of indigenous peoples and environmental defenders in the country and 
worldwide, who continue to fight, sometimes at the cost of their own lives, 
to protect the integrity and livelihoods associated with sustainable farming 
cultures and caretaking of the environment———informed and compounded by years of 
forced migration, adaptation to volatile weather events and long term occupancy 
of the land. Today, the Philippines, a postcolonial nation of Spain and the 
United States, privileges development and infrastructure expansion in the 
countrysides and provinces adjacent to urban centres causing the tension between 
the state, “well-meaning” NGOs and local people when negotiating the terms 
for utilizing land that overlaps in potential for infrastructure development, 
protected areas, and sites of the country’s natural resources———or for the 
greater public good.
This work uses the case of geothermal energy, a renewable energy source often 
touted for its scientific and technological innovation, against the discourse 
around natural resource management to reckon with the capitalist market-driven 
practice of planning to one that explores building of infrastructure, a public-
serving architectural good, that centers the most vulnerable and moves at the 
speed of the people’s trust. I am grateful for the solidarity and allyship 
provided by other oppressed peoples of colour: particularly the Indigenous 
communities in Canada where I have seen how institutions can meaningfully 
acknowledge and act on justice to reconcile with past harms, and the Black 
community in the US and larger African diaspora (especially those from other 
island nations) who still experience displacement for the sake of making room 
for the non-minority, privileged white body. Moving at the speed of trust is 
borrowed from the Blackspace Manifesto, which has thoughtfully articulated for 
spatial practitioners (planners and architects) how we can privilege lived 
experiences and foster meaningful projects in both disciplines.
As the Philippines continues to manage external agents (development agencies, 
foreign investors, private companies, and other country governments) that 
have come to the aid of the country’s ambitious and aggressive infrastructure 
development, this thesis advocates and aims to amplify the voices that have been 
(for decades) and continue to flag where damage by shortsighted decisions could 





























62-foot-wide 15-digit electric clock art 
display) across Union Square on 14th Street in 
Manhattan, was revealed to show “the Earth (is) 
on a deadline.” Though our race to reduce our 
carbon dioxide emissions to save the planet 
from irreversible damage has been understood 
globally for some time now, the Metronome 
surprised many (including myself) that we may 
have less time than we thought.
6 2 9 2 1 4 5 9
New York City, US
0
As	of	4:00	PM	EST	on	Sunday,	March	14th,	



























Per capita CO₂ emissions
Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the burning of fossil fuels for energy and cement production. Land use
change is not included.








Source: OWID based on CDIAC; Global Carbon Project; Gapminder & UN
Note: CO2 emissions are measured on a production basis, meaning they do not correct for emissions embedded in traded goods.




Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the burning of fossil fuels for energy and cement production. Land use change is not included.
In terms of actors, the United States and 
other global superpowers hold the most 
responsibility for emissions with per capita 
rates consistently above 15 metric tons of 
CO2	per	capita	since	the	early	1960s	(Figure	
1). But the paradox for many countries in the 
Global South is that they experience the most 
pervasive events of climate change———natural 
disasters———despite their relative global 
contribution. As of 2018, the Philippines has 
contributed approximately 0.2% to the global 
cumulative of carbon dioxide emissions. With a 
per capita emission rate at 0.88 metric tons in 
2010 (the United States emitted 18.45 tons that 
same year), the country experiences at least 
twenty (20) extreme weather events annually 
(PAGASA, 2016).
With the government’s ambitious goals of 
increasing its renewable energy capacity 
to 15,304 MW by 2030 in response to its 
worsening energy crisis———aging infrastructure, 
exponentially increasing population and 
subsequent demand, and persistent brownouts 
(unintentional drop in voltage of an electrical 
power supply system)———it would be assumed that 
progress is well underway for this tropical 
country that is abundant in potential for 
high solar yield, hydroelectric, wind and 
especially geothermal energy capture. Yet, 
Figure 2 (below) shows regular spikes and 
a recent upward trend of increased carbon 
dioxide emissions associated with energy 
Carbon intensity of energy production
Carbon intensity of energy production is measured as the quantity of carbon dioxide emitted per unit of energy
production. This is measured in kilograms of CO2 per kilowatt-hour.










Source: Calculated by Our World in Data based on Global Carbon Project; BP; IEA via the World Bank
CARBON INTENSITY OF ENERGY PRODUCTION
Carbon intensity of energy production is measured as the quantity of carbon dioxide emitted per unit of energy production.
This is measured in kilograms of CO2 per kilowatt-hour.
production since its lowest point in the mid 
1980s	(just	after	the	first	wave	of	geothermal	
energy development in the country). A closer 
look and review of the country’s steps 
towards energy generation and environmental 
conservation reveals meaningful insights into 
how climate adaptation policies have been 
disseminated, violent injustices prevailed, 
and ultimately the failure of most state and 
NGO-led development projects to improve the 
socioeconomic status and welfare of Filipinx 
people.
As of 2013, 21 million Filipinxs still do 
not have access to reliable energy services 
(Uy,	2016),	and	90.4%	of	households	are	still	
categorized as “energy poor” (a term used to 
define a lack of physical access to modern 
energy	infrastructure)	(Mendoza	et	al,	2019).	
However, a look at energy prices reveals 
an even more inequitably felt cost at an 
individual level.
Today, energy prices remain one of the most 
expensive compared to its Asian neighbours: 
Manila (the country’s central urban capital 
and metropolitan city) has the third highest 
generation cost, highest grid cost, third 
highest value added tax imposed on energy, and 
second highest overall residential electricity 
tariff (the first being Tokyo) (Uy, 2016). 
Currently, 15% of residential electric bills 






















funding the incentives for renewable energy 
development and the cost of debt incurred by 
the government (Uy, 2016).
Therefore, an analysis of policies, 
administration, and social landscape during 
the country’s first geothermal energy projects 
serves as a meaningful lens for understanding 
sustainable development as “access to 
affordable and reliable energy sources and 
services has been a necessary component in 
reducing poverty, increasing productivity, 
enhancing competitiveness, and promoting 
economic	growth”	(Mendoza	et	al,	2019).	This	
research attempts to outline the overlapping 
government jurisdictions and policies that 
muddle management of land in the name of 
development, and seeks to understand how some 
of these have and continue to act as barriers 
to substantial improvements for local people.
THE GLOBAL ENERGY CRISIS
AND CLIMATE CHANGE
The Philippines, a 7,107-island archipelago in 
the Western Pacific Region, is a country that 
has unavoidably been under the mercy of the 
volatile shifts in the global energy economy 
even	before	the	World	Oil	Crises	of	the	1970s	
(La	Viña	et	al,	2011).	In	1936,	the	National	
Power Corporation (NPC) was established to 
‘construct, operate and maintain facilities 
for the production of electricity’ and was the 
dominant player holding a monopoly over the 
country’s energy industry until reforms began 
in	2001.	By	the	1950s,	the	Philippines	was	only	
at 20% of electrification across the country 
and	in	1962,	then	called	Philippine	Commission	
on Volcanology (COMVOL) began exploring 
geothermal energy for electricity production.
In	1973,	the	first	world	oil	crisis	shook	
the global energy network, and revealed the 
pitfalls of oil interdependence between the 
Global North and South. At face value, the 
Arab oil embargo, gross oil increase by 
OPEC, and subsequent production cutbacks by 
Arab oil producers, forced countries like 
the Philippines and its Southeast Asian 
counterparts, to rethink their heavy reliance 
on foreign imports for energy generation 
(Ichord	Jr,	1974).	During	the	world	oil	crisis,	
the region was highly dependent on major 
international oil companies from the Middle 
East, principally Exxon, Shell, Caltex, Mobil 
and British Petroleum (BP) for its energy. 
Even key oil producing nations in Southeast 
Asia, Malaysia and Indonesia, relied on the 
Middle East to support its domestic needs, 
while exporting low-sulphur oil to Japan 
and the United States for premium costs at 
the	same	time	(Ichord	Jr,	1974).	In	turn,	
countries in Southeast Asia (except Vietnam and 
Laos) began establishing their capacity for 
domestic refineries to address rising costs and 
established the region’s role in downstream 
operations in the oil industry. Despite the 
industry’s previous resistance to developing 
“export-oriented refineries,” Southeast Asia 
became the playground for global superpowers 
to explore for oil, with US companies and the 


























































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
WORLD GEOTHERMAL ELECTRICITY
(Bertami, 2012)
Installed capacity from 1950 up to 2015 (left, MW) and produced electricity (right, GWh)
UNDERSTANDING THE POTENTIAL
OF GEOTHERMAL ENERGY
In the landscape of renewable energy, 
geothermal energy is an underutilized but 
increasingly important resource in the 
Southeast Asia region and the larger 25,000 
mile Pacific Ring of Fire (Figure 3) it sits 
in. Geothermal energy (the Earth’s heat) is a 
thermal energy dominant in countries located 
along plate boundaries where volcanoes and 
earthquakes dominate, meaning countries that 
border the Pacific Ocean (both the Global 
North and South), share an abundant resource 
of renewable energy just below their surfaces. 
Today, geothermal energy infrastructure exists 
primarily at two scales: residential (for those 
who can afford it) and large-scale industrial. 
The ten (10) largest capturing sites are 
located across the globe in the western coasts 
of North America (US and Mexico), Southeast 
Asia, Iceland and Italy. Eight (8) of these ten 
(10) plants are located in the Ring of Fire, 
and three (3) of the ten (10) are located in 
the Philippines.
The country’s hilly topography and island 
topography are a direct product of its location 
in this volcanic region, but also the cause 
for the country’s regular misfortune and crisis 
from annual extreme weather events over the 
years. Not only is the Philippines located 
in this Ring of Fire, but it also sits in 
a typhoon belt, which makes the country far 
too familiar to devastating typhoons and the 
debts associated with rebuilding from such 
catastrophic events.
Through a review of policy, financing for 
energy projects, and the country’s social 
history	since	the	1970s,	this	thesis	highlights	
the failures of the state and NGO-intervention 
to improve the socioeconomic status and overall 
welfare of the Filipinx people. Despite an 
exacerbation of risks and conditions caused 
by climate change, competing drivers of 
development have led to an environmental 

































































































































POWERING THE “LITTLE BROWN BROTHER”
Despite present-day independence, US 
imperialism continues to pervade the economy 
and livelihoods of Filipinx people to this 
day. Though American rule and the Philippines’ 
official designation as a US territory ended 
in	1946,	it	should	be	made	clear	that	US	
exceptionalism remains the root of established 
policies and institutions still present in the 
country. Even after independence, Filipinx 
leaders continued to welcome American influence 
“as the blessing of a benevolent patron” 
(Karnow,	1989).
During American colonization, two competing 
criteria for post-colonial legitimation drove 
development as the Philippines strove to prove 
its functionality (completing American-started 
infrastructural projects) and its civilization 
(developing from their perceived “savage” 
status) to its big brother America (Martinez, 
2017). Policies like ‘Filipinization’ during 
American Governor General Harrisburg’s reign 
and its associated pensionado program that 
brought Filipinx elites to the United States 
to be educated of the “American” way (so as 
to eventually bring customs and institutions 
learned back to their own country), only 
strengthened the seemingly “incurably romantic” 
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10 HIGHEST PRODUCING GEOTHERMAL PLANTS IN THE WORLD 
3 of which are in the Philippines (highlighted)
Newell and Phillips (2016) offer insight into 
the nature of Global South countries in their 
low carbon energy transitions, primarily that 
they are strongly influenced by the process 
of neoliberalisation. They argue that the 
“structural and disciplinary power of capital 
and global institutions set the terms of 
said transitions.” Though their study in 2016 
focuses on Kenya as a case study, Kenya’s 
transition to a more equitable and sustainable 
energy future while dealing with issues of 
power and political economy, give us insight 
into the nature of Philippines’ development and 
competing policy objectives involved. I argue 
that the Philippines’ tumultuous political 
leadership, particularly the Martial Law 
era during then President Ferdinand Marcos’ 
regime, may be why national implementation has 
continued to suffer.
The Martial Law era marks the rise and fall 
of the elite technocrats in the Philippines, 
and established Marcos’ authoritarian rule 
over the nation. Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem 
(2013) of the University of the Philippines 
Diliman outlines how the views and development 
vision during this time was shared by the 
country’s major donors, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; 






















writes, “for as long as the technocracy could 
access the needed IMF/World Bank loans for the 
country, the leadership gave it substantive 
bargaining leverage” (Tadem, 2013). This in 
turn deteriorated the country’s economic and 
political instability, which peaked at the 
global	economic	recession	of	1981	(Tadem,	
2013).
THE WOUNDS LEFT BY THE MARCOS ERA
On	September	21st,	1972,	then	president	
Ferdinand Marcos signed Proclamation No. 1081 
placing the Philippines under Martial Law for 
the next 14 years———with their dictatorship 
ultimately	ending	in	1986	with	the	peaceful	
demonstrations of the EDSA People Power 
Revolution). Martial Law, suspends the function 
of a government by civil law and places direct 
control under military purview, a tactic 
that Marcos justified to curb the increasing 
“communist threat” by the Communist Party of 
the Philippines (CPP), Mindanao Independence 
Movement (MIM), and ultimately any and all 
dissent by his political adversaries. This 
consolidation of power marks a troubling and 
painful time in the Philippines where the 
legacy of the Martial Law regime is associated 
with a gross violation of human rights 
(Figure 4, left)
“FM DECLARES MARTIAL LAW”—
the headline of the September 24, 1972 issue of the Sunday 
Express, which was the Sunday edition of Philippines Daily 
Express. The Daily Express was the only newspaper allowed to 
circulate upon the declaration of Martial Law
that targeted student activists, political 
opponents, intellectuals, farmers, workers; 
anyone against the Marcos administration. 
According to Amnesty International, 70,000 
people were imprisoned, 34,000 were tortured 
and 3,240 were killed during Martial Law.
Yet, those who turn a blind eye to the dark 
realities of Martial Law which would go on 
to fuel the People Power Revolution tout the 
Martial Law era as a time where the nation 
prospered due to the Marcos administration’s 
aggressive infrastructure projects. Both 
Ferdinand and Imelda built schools, hospitals, 
bridges, roads and more with the stroke of a 
pen thanks to PD and EO privileges, overriding 
any discussion in the Senate or Congress.
COMPETING DEVELOPMENT DRIVERS
In communications theory, the cognitive process 
of selectivity prescribes that every person 
is a cultural bearer: therefore, “no one can 
categorically claim that (their) experience is 
more accurate than another’s in the absolute 
sense”	(Flor	&	Librero,	1999).	This	frames	two	
conflicts in this discussion: between state-
partnered NGOs and local communities (micro), 
and the biodiversity conservation regime and 
the indigenous peoples’ regime (macro). When 
addressing climate change, who knows what’s 
best? 
Alexander G. Flor, Professor and Dean of the 
University of the Philippines Faculty of 
Information and Communication Studies (FICS), 
offers a variety of research in this regard, 
through their many studies on environmental 
communication and knowledge management 
systems in rural communities, especially with 
indigenous peoples. From understanding the 
on-the-ground implications of eAgriculture to 
site-specific studies on projects like the 
geothermal plant at Mount Apo———an “ecosystem 
under	stress”	as	they	describe	(1993),	Flor	
provides insight into the nuances experienced 
by indigenous peoples and historical accounts 
of these sites of public contestation.
Their	framework	in	their	1993	case	study	of	the	
Mount Apo Geothermal Plant identities five (5) 
primary points of view that conflict in these 
energy development projects:
     (1) the Environmentalist Point of View,
     (2) the Lumad (indigenous peoples) Point 
 of View,
     (3) the Resource Utilization Point of 
 View,
     (4) the Crisis Governance Point of View,
 and
     (5) the Economic Point of View.
These views are not mutually exclusive, and 
offer a starting point for understanding 
consensus building and public perception of 
renewable energy and climate adaptation policy. 
In summary, the Economic, Resource Utilization 
and Crisis Governance points of view (POV) 
are primarily held by the state, the NGOs and 
development agencies (IMF/World Bank) which 























The Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), 
established	in	1973,	considers	sites	like	
Mount Apo, the cheapest and cleanest source of 
energy (resource utilization POV), whereas the 
power crisis and need to address the country’s 
demand (crisis governance and economic views 
points of view) are what connect the state 
and the NGOs funding such projects; proving a 
market-driven development ideology. Arguably, 
the environmentalist POV is shared by both 
NGOs, the Department of Energy and National 
Resources (DENR, a national agency), and 
local people with sites of geothermal energy 
development often situated in national parks 
and the country’s rich forested areas. But the 
“stewardship stalemate” lies at the conflict 
between the Lumad (indigenous peoples) POV and 
these other development drivers, ultimately 
posing a devastating threat to the livelihood, 
beliefs and self-determination of the country’s 
indigenous peoples. Though policies are in 
place	now	(in	1996,	social	acceptability	was	
formally adopted into the implementing rules 
and regulations of the DENR Administrative 
Order	of	1992	that	reinforced	the	importance	of	
public engagement in the environmental impact 
assessment process), this did not exist during 
the creation of the country’s first geothermal 






































How can we amplify the needs 
of indigenous peoples and 
shift power to them?
geothermal power plant projects (recall that 
these are 2 of the 3 largest geothermal plants 
in the world, located in the Philippines). 
According to the Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative 
Order	(DAO)	1996-37,	‘social	acceptability’	is	
defined as,
“the result of a process mutually agreed upon by 
the DENR, key stakeholders and the proponent 
to ensure that the valid and relevant concerns 
of stakeholders, including affected communities, 
are fully considered and/or resolved in the 
decision-making process for granting or denying 
the issuance of an Environmental Compliance 
Certificate (ECC).”
But with President Ferdinand Marcos, 
exploration ran free for outside stakeholders 
and lacked any sort of due diligence to keep 
the nation accountable to the needs of the 
general public, much less its most vulnerable 
and seemingly ‘weak’ populations.
I emphasize the struggle of indigenous peoples 
in the Philippines as it highlights how views 
of “savagery” on a perceived “less civilized” 
population were reinforced and duplicated 
domestically in the nation, and highlight 
the need for justice for this underserved 
group. Just as the Spanish and then Americans 
colonized the country, the Philippines’ has 
stifled and marginalized indigenous peoples 
with respect to its progress and development. 
Padmapani L. Perez and the BUKLURAN-The 
Philippine ICCA Consortium (2018) offer an 
indigenous critique of Philippine environmental 
policy. As the details of the Indigenous 
Communities’ Conserved Areas and Territories 
(ICCA) bill are being negotiated today in 
Congress, Perez reviews the consultations, 
policy dialogues, roundtable discussions 
and documents related to the ICCA Bill and 
centers the voice of indigenous participants 
to challenge state-managed biodiversity 
conservation. Through this study, Perez (2018) 
underscores the experience of indigenous 
leaders with state-managed biodiversity 
conservation under the National Integrated 
Protected	Areas	Systems	of	1992	(NIPAS,	or	
RA 7586) and their frustrations with the 
implementation of the Indigenous Peoples 
Rights	Act	of	1997	(IPRA,	or	RA	8371),	
sharing stories of how market-driven land 
conversion to commercial farming is blamed on 
deforestation caused by indigenous people in 
protected areas. The latter being rightfully 
challenged by indigenous leaders, asserting 
the fact that “they themselves are the reason 
the forest is still there” (Perez & with 
BUKLURAN-The Philippine ICCA Consortium, 
2018). Other experiences show how enclosure 
and regulation under the conservation regime 
also limit information flows, creating the 
environment where there is little awareness 
that the problem may be systematic, or shared 
worldwide (Perez & with BUKLURAN-The Philippine 
ICCA Consortium, 2018). Their thoughtful 
and thorough study that centers and uplifts 
indigenous perspectives in the ICCA Bill 
negotiations provides a shift from valorization 
and demystification of indigenous relationships 
with nature, and focuses on critique as a 
meaningful mode of indigenous participation in 
policy-making. This shift to seeing indigenous 
peoples and host communities as experts may be 
key to future implementation.
ENERGY POLICY AND EXTERNAL AID 
DURING THE MARCOS REGIME
Because the foundation of energy policy began 
during the Marcos regime, I argue that this may 
be why today, large infrastructure projects 
promoted by current administrations have a 
deeply rooted negative connotation. 
The Martial Law era marked a dark time in 
Philippine history, alongside the prominence of 
free-market technocracy that had a stronghold 
over economic decision-making (Tadem, 2013). 
Though scholars argue that Marcos’ economic 
policies would have likely passed during 
this time, it was their view that subjecting 
his policies to time-consuming debates in 
Philippine Congress and thus, martial law 
giving him power to implement immediately was 
problematic and in direct contradiction of the 
democratic processes learned from America. 
Martial law allows the executive, legislative, 
and judicial powers to be under full control of 
the President, and more problematically removes 
the right for any form of protest; furthering 
their view that this “facade of political 
stability” would attract multinational 






















Two years, after then President Ferdinand 
Marcos (10th President of the Philippines) came 
into leadership, the Geothermal Energy, Natural 
Gas,	and	Methane	Law	(RA	No.	5092),	was	enacted	
to,
‘promote and regulate the exploration, 
development, exploitation, and utilization of 
indigenous energy sources.‘
This is of note as it highlights exploration 
and efforts to decrease dependency on foreign 
oil	had	already	begun	before	the	1973	world	oil	
crisis.	RA	5092	outlined	that	the	participation	
in such activities was limited to Filipinx 
citizens and associations incorporated in the 
Philippines with at least 60% of shares owned 
by Filipinx citizens, a seemingly positive 
notion of where power in energy production 
should be. But details of the act mark it as 
the first stipulation that natural gases and 
geothermal energy resources belong to the 
state, and enabled the government to set aside 
and reserve lands to support such reservations. 
A follow-up presidential decree, PD 1442 
established that,
‘The Government may directly explore for, exploit 
and develop geothermal resources. It may also 
indirectly undertake the same under service 
contracts awarded through public bidding or 
concluded through negotiation, with a domestic 
or foreign contractor who must be technically 
and financially capable of undertaking the 
operations required in the service contract.‘
This meant that the state maintained ownership, 
but the winner of a contract that lasted for 25 
years (and was extendable for up to 15), had 
the power outlined above with a share breakdown 
of 60-40 for the government and contractor 
respectively. However, the main critique of 
this policy was its heavy taxation burden 
on private investors (Campen & Rai, 2015), 
and subsequently no private international 
investments resulted from this policy.
In	1970,	the	National	Power	Company	(recall	
that this is the dominant player managing 
energy production in the country) entered an 
agreement with the Philippine Geothermal Inc 
(PGI) to begin a feasibility and viability 
study in Tiwi, Albay in the Bicol Region; the 
would-be future site of the Tiwi Geothermal 
Power Plant. It should be noted that the PGI 
was a subsidiary of the Union Oil Company 
of	California.	Subsequently,	the	PD	739	
established 17,661 hectares of in Albay as the 
Tiwi geothermal reservation based on findings 
from the study.
It	was	in	September	1972	that	President	Marcos	
signed Proclamation No. 1081 placing the 
country officially under martial law. That 
same year, PD 40 established the basic policies 
of the electric power industry, effectively 
nationalising and asserting NPC’s monopoly in 
the sector. Soon after, NPC entered a bilateral 
energy cooperation agreement with the New 
Zealand government allowing for exploratory 




established the Philippine National Oil Company 
(PNOC), a direct institutional response in 
reducing its dependence on imported fuel 
and a nationalizing of  oil refining and 
distribution. As mentioned, the two (2) main 
geothermal energy projects during the Marcos 
regime still boast the largest capturing sites 
across the world but exploration for resource 
viability during this time was beyond the 
capacity	of	the	nation.	In	1976,	the	PNOC	
established its subsidiary company the PNOC-
Energy Development Corporation which was the 
agency that received intense technical training 
and financial assistance from other countries 
and external stakeholders (read: the “experts,” 
like the New Zealand government and the World 
Bank). 
At face value, the role of NGOs and foreign 
governments to provide technical assistance 
is seemingly harmless, and are celebrated 
from the humanitarian point of view; in other 
words, perceived as “the least” agencies of 
the Global North could do for its “lesser” 
Global South counterparts. Indeed, capacity 
building is key to development discourse, but 
scholars like Philippe Ryfman describe how the 
structures of nongovernmental organizations in 
humanitarian and development aid are subject to 
the pressures of the public institutions that 
fund them (Ryfman, 2017). The role of public 
subsidies for development and humanitarian aid 
is subject to criticism, with 30% of American 
agencies like USAID funding received from 
public aid (the latter 70% is acquired by 
private funding) (Ryfman, 2017). USAID, which 
remains active in the country, is partnered 
with the Mercy Corps and the Peace Corps. 
I argue that these “corps” organizations 
stimulate negative feelings in countries 
like the Philippines due to their military-
like deployment and intrusion in communities 
worldwide, and particularly so for the Filipinx 
(Figure 5)
The Marcos family infamously carrying, what would later be discovered as valuables in diaper boxes (Imelda‘s jewelry) as they de-plane US Air Force C-141 at in Honolulu, Hawaii‘s Hickam 
Air Force Base
people due to their complex relationship 
with the military (beyond America’s longtime 
military occupation and use for the country 
as a base, or colonization, the islands were 
seen as a paradise for soldiers exploiting 
its people and culture for many years) 
(Gonzalez, 2013). However more interestingly 
is the role that military powers had in the 
eventual escape of the Marcoses’ following 
the	People	Power	Revolution	in	1986,	which	
successfully ousted the Marcos dictatorship 
in peaceful protest and eventual coup. By the 
time hundreds of thousands of Filipinxs arrived 
at Malacañang Palace (the official residence 
of the President), the Marcoses were granted 
safe passage and escorted by four American 
helicopters and taken to the US Air Force’s 
Clark Air Base eight-three miles north of 
Manila (Gonzalez, 2013). From there, Ferdinand, 
wife Imelda Marcos and children were taken to 
Guam and then Hawai’i, outlining the American 
imperial circuit on smaller Pacific islands.
Understanding the deployment of “American 
Pacifism” to secure and provide safety on the 
ground, especially throughout more rural and 
isolated islands in the Philippines during 
American occupation served as the foundation 
for still active militias and guerilla groups 
that confiscate aid delivered by NGOs, using 
the money for their own agendas; a problem 
still in play today, contributing to the 
mistrust and ultimately lack of surprise 
when development aid is not received by an 
intended community. This aspirational role 
of nongovernmental organizations to “provide 
assistance to impoverished or endangered 






















quality assistance” is thereby threatened 
and remains unfulfilled for many development 
projects in the Philippines. Jean-Hervé Bradol, 
president of Médecins Sans Frontières (MDF-
France), writes that NGOs “must be vigilant 
[in] the management of significant resources 
[so that it] does not take the upper hand over 
the purpose of [their] activities,” criticizing 
that NGOs must “work on any faulty aspects 
of [their] interventions” (Ryfman, 2017). 
The financing of NGOs Ryfman argues mimics 
the vertical top-down nature of corporate 
governance, thereby creating a hierarchical, 
capitalistic, market-driven development that I 
argue makes NGOs are complicit actors of the 
technocratic Marcos’ state. Though American 
philanthropic tradition separates a board of 
directors from the paid staff that execute 
projects on the ground, it is optimistic to say 
that NGOs are working in complete isolation 
from the interests of its shareholders thereby 
leaving governance of nongovernmental culture 





in debt due to its inability to efficiently 
operate and expand on its existing portfolio 
(Mendoza	et	al,	2019).	With	the	restoration	
of democratic rule and the welcome of the 
country’s first female President Corazon 
Aquino, her government issued Executive Order 
215 (which amended PD No. 40) to divest from 
the NPC and establish a wider privatization 
process by enabling independent power producers 
to enter build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
contracts. The establishment of BOT Law (RA 
6957)	thus	marked	the	second	wave	of	geothermal	
energy development, finally enticing private 
companies to participate in the investment, 
construction and expansion of geothermal energy 



















SHARE OF ENERGY 
TYPES IN 
PHILIPPINES
(Bakhtyar et al, 2013)
The Philippines, along with its neighbour 
and fellow member of ASEAN (the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations) Indonesia, are 
centres of energy production and consumption 
in Asia, but share similar pressures on their 
energy systems due to their rapidly growing 
populations, industrialization, and increasing 
consumption (Bakhtyar et al, 2013).
Through	the	1990s,	energy	demands	began	
causing severe, nation-wide power shortages, 
interrupting livelihoods for hours and even 
days at the time, which are attributed to the 
NPC’s failure to effectively maintain existing 
plants that were operating at 50-70% of its 
installed capacity. These shortages, coupled 
with the relentless natural calamity, thereby 
continues the country’s reliance on agencies 
like the Asian Development Bank (whose base is 
in Manila) and the World Bank for aid, building 
on the nation’s debt and once again, deterred 
any new energy investments for the country 
(Ratio	et	al,	2019).
Subsequent administrations post-Marcos are 
difficult to fully blame for the stagnation of 
renewable energy infrastructure development 
but as mentioned, may be why citizens have been 
more skeptical and risk-averse to monumental 
infrastructure projects proposed ever since. 
As previously discussed, the high cost 
of residential electricity is still 
tied to foreign oil imports, but also 
miscellaneous costs for subsidies for the 
elderly, marginalized end-consumers, rural 
electrification, incentives for renewable 
energy development, and the debt incurred by 
the government (Uy, 2016). As a country riddled 
with growing socioeconomic inequity and a 
widening income gap between its elite and most 
vulnerable populations, perhaps the true irony 
lies in current trends (Figure 6 below) that 
show an alarming increase in oil, gas and coal 
(fossil fuels) as the country grapples with 
addressing its crisis-worthy energy demands. 
(Figure 6)
(Figure 7)
Photo taken July 17, 2019 in 
Mandaluyong City, Manila, 
Philippines (by author)
Sociologist	Barry	Schwartz	(1996)	describes	
the power of social movements in its ability 
to evoke a model of society, describing events 
of the past, and also a model for society, 
by providing guidelines for the present and 
future.  By understanding our history, we can 
activate them to inform society’s institutional 
and collective memory to provide meaningful 
solutions for the present-day issues; thereby 
becoming a “culture-specific source of 
legitimizing ideologies” (Liu & Gastardo-
Conaco, 2011). In close, I argue that balancing 
and protecting the welfare of the country’s 
most vulnerable populations indisputably 
intertwines with energy policy and we must be 
careful so as to not repeat past development 
harms.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Post-colonial legitimation drove infrastructure development
• NGOs were complicit actors of the technocratic Marcos‘ state
• Geothermal energy was explored with the technical assistance and training from foreign 
governments and agencies
• Environmental impact assessments and social acceptability measures were not yet present
• Philippine electricity today is very expensive ($$$)
As the livelihoods of the Filipinx people 
are interrupted with persistent blackouts 
and brownouts, the increase in fossil fuel 
consumption led by current President Rodrigo 
Duterte, highlights a short-sighted trap that 
may ultimately cost the country and its people 
even more disastrous climate events in its 
future.
LEARNING FROM HISTORY
Returning to Professor Flor’s framework of 
competing development perspectives when 
managing the environment and natural resources 
in the Philippines, we must therefore tread 
carefully and critically at what points of 
view are ultimately driving development in the 
context of climate adaptation policy, in this 
case for renewable energy. Though policies 
like the Renewable Energy Act of 2008 (RA 
9153)	exist	today,	providing	relatively	safer	
incentives for foreign capital to enter the 
country through feed-in tariffs (FiT), there is 
still a lack of accountability and meaningful 
precedent in how benefits can be equitably 
distributed at a community level. Indeed, the 
Renewable Energy Act now ensures that host 
communities and indigenous groups receive 80% 
of shares from royalty, and more layers of due 
diligence (environmental impact assessments 
tied to social acceptability) are in place to 
facilitate this. But it is difficult not to 
question whether justice and arguably, more 
attention needs to be placed on the welfare of 
the communities who have grown to live around 
Marcos-era geothermal plants. Today, the Bicol 
region is one of the most disaster-prone in the 
country (experiencing at least two to three of 
the twenty annual typhoons), and the province 
of Albay, site of the Tiwi Geothermal Power 
Plant, was identified as the top province most 
vulnerable to climate and weather-related risks 
(Grefalda et al, 2017). As it sits “sa daan 
ng bagyo” (translates to “in the path of the 
storm”), a phrase that many Filipinxs including 
my parents often use to describe the region, 
much of my mother’s family is still among the 
45.1% of Bicolanos that are poor and earn well 















































































BICOL AS A CASE AREA OF STUDY
For this study, the Bicol region is chosen as 
the primary area of study as it is home to the 
Tiwi Geothermal Complex (1 of the 3 largest 
geothermal plants as previously described), 
has an understudied indigenous population, 
and defined as one of the most disaster-
prone areas in the country due to its unique 
geographic location and physical environment 
(Guiriba,	2019).	Located	at	the	southeastern	
peninsula of Luzon Island (the same island of 
the country’s capital and central metropolis, 
Manila———approximately 300 km or 186 miles 
away), the region has an approximate population 
of six (6) million people spread across six (6) 
provinces: Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines 
Sur, Sorsogon, Catanduanes and Masbate.
Joined by a long coastline, the peninsula 
comprises volcanic highlands and the Bicol 
Plain (a low-land area that is home to much 
of the region’s rice production) which is 
vulnerable to flooding, drought and typhoons. 
Bicol is also home to Mount Malinao (where the 
Tiwi Geothermal Complex is located at the base 
of) and an active stratovolcano Mount Mayon 
(part of the Albay Biosphere Reserve). The two 
city centers are Legaspi (the historic port 
that once offered reprieve for Spanish sailors 
traveling between Manila and Acapulco, Mexico) 
and Naga City which are the major hubs for 
transit, tourism, and exchange of goods in and 
out of the region.
Historically, the region has seen arguably 
slow development despite its use as a port 
during Spanish colonization and attention 
from development agencies like the World 
Bank	since	the	1970s.	According	to	the	Bicol	
regional development plan (2016), 45.1% of 
Bicolanos are poor———meaning almost 3 million 
people earn well below what is required to 
address their basic needs. The main sources 
of income in the region are derived from the 
agricultural (more than 42 percent of the 
region’s total workforce), forestry and fishing 
sectors; highlighting the impact of climate 
change because these activities are weather-
dependent (farming and fishing). Rice and 
corn are the main crops, which are primarily 
rainfed (Grefalda et al, 2017). During El Niño 
events, the river dries up, limiting access 
to irrigation for farmers, and soil erosion 
pervades the uplands and forests due to extreme 
drought. The region is also affected by other 
climatic changes such as sea level rise, 
increased rainfall, and warmer temperatures 
(Grefalda et al, 2017). Compounded by the 
risk posed by still active Mount Mayon (which 
historically caused mass migration from Bicol 
during a category 4 eruption in 1814 and 
engulfed	three	villages	in	1968———displacing	
approximately 20,000 people), I argue that 
Bicol is a site overdue for environmental 
justice. 
(Figure 8, left)
Map of Bicol with historic 
typhoon paths created by author
(Figure	9,	right)
Photo of a farmer on a 
Carabao cart in Albay, 
Bicol taken between 1910 
and 1915. Retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, part 
of the George Grantham 
Bain Collection
HISTORY OF DISASTER EVENTS AND 
CLIMATE ADAPTATION EFFORTS
Due to climate change, the region suffers from 
a prolonged rainy season (La Niña), prolonged 
drought (El Niño) and strong typhoons. Of 
the twenty (20) typhoons each year that the 
Philippines experiences, two to three of the 
most destructive ones directly impact Bicolanos 
(PAGASA, 2016). Historically, Typhoon Reming 
(Durian), Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan), and Typhoon 
Nina (Nock-ten), which are categorized as 
the most damaging in the country, all passed 
through Bicol. Winds reach upward speeds of 
180 to 320 kilometers per hour (km/hr), with 
2006 Typhoon Reming (Durian) being the most 
devastating.
NO LOCAL NAME INTERNATIONAL 
NAME






1 Reming Durian November 26 - December 1, 2006 6 DAYS 320 199
* Rolly Goni October 26 - November 6, 2020 11 DAYS 315 196
2 Yolanda Haiyan November	7-9,	2013 3 DAYS 315 196
3 Nina Nock-ten December 24-27, 2016 3 DAYS 290 180
4 Sening Joan October	11-15,	1970 5 DAYS 275 171
5 Rosing Angela October	30	-	November	4,	1995 6 DAYS 260 162
6 Anding Irma November	21-27,	1981 7 DAYS 260 162
7 Glenda Rammasun July 13-17, 2016 5 DAYS 259 161
8 Loleng Babs October	15-24,	1998 10 DAYS 250 155
9 Yayang Vera November	4-7,	1979 4 DAYS 240 149
10 Sisang Roger November	23-27,	1987 5 DAYS 240 149
11 Herming Betty August	7-14,	1987 8 DAYS 240 149
12 Saling Dot October	15-20,	1985 6 DAYS 240 149
13 Unsang Ruby October	21-26,	1988 6 DAYS 215 134
14 Warling Tip November	17-27,	1983 11 DAYS 205 127
15 Welming Emma October	31	-	November	8,	1967 9	DAYS 205 127
16 Yoling Patsy November	17-20,	1970 4 DAYS 200 124
17 Kading Rita October	25-27,	1978 3 DAYS 185 115
18 Huaning Haitang June	22	-	July	2,	1976 10 DAYS 185 115
19 Dindo Nida May	13-19,	2004 7 DAYS 185 115
20 Milenyo Xangsane September 25-30, 2006 6 DAYS 180 112
(Figure 11, below)
Typhoon Rolly occurred during the writing of this thesis, which is the strongest 
typhoon since 2013‘s devastating Typhoon Yolanda and lasted for 11 days.
(Figure 10, right)
The center of 2020 Typhoon Rolly, just east of the shore of 
Bicol, impacted the island province of the region, Catanduanes, 
the hardest. The Philippines‘ Department of Energy “targeted” 
Christmas (a month and a half after the event) as the date for 


























The typhoons impact Bicolanos livelihoods 
and the region’s infrastructure the most, 
most devastatingly the loss of harvest and 
crops, reducing the region’s food security. 
After Typhoon Reming in 2006, the Food 
and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the 
United Nations conducted an assessment that 
revealed Albay, Camarines Sur and Sorsogon 
as the most highly affected areas. In turn, 
a technical cooperation programme project 
called “Strengthening Capacities for Climate 
Risk Management and Disaster Preparedness in 
Selected Provinces of the Philippines (Bicol 
Region)”	was	established	in	1997.	The	project’s	
main objectives provide a perfect example of 
the duality of ambition that resiliency and 
capacity development projects hold:
1. enhance the institutional and technical 
capacities within the Department of 
Agriculture (DA), Philippine Atmospheric, 
Geophysical and Astronomical Services 
Administration (PAGASA) and local 
institutions to better manage climate-related 
risks and promote local level preparedness 
against recurrent natural hazards such as 
typhoons, floods and drought; and 
2. improve the livelihood resilience and food 
security of farmers and fisherfolk who are 
highly vulnerable to the frequent occurrence 
of extreme climatic events.
Albay was identified as the top province most 
vulnerable to climate and weather-related 
risks such as typhoons and projected rainfall 
change (Grefalda et al, 2018) according to 
a 2005 study by Manila Observatory. Albay, 
bound by the Pacific Ocean (East), Samar Sea 
(Southeast), and the Sibuyan Sea (Southwest), 
has a 16% frequency probability of experiencing 
destructive typhoons due to its location (Uy et 
al, 2010). 2006 Typhoon Durian (locally named 
Reming) was the worst disaster in the region 
thus far, affecting over one million people 
and damaging $71 million USD worth of property 
(APSEMO, 2010). It is reported that the average 
annual damage caused by disasters amounts to 
PHP	19.7	billion	(405.4	million	USD).
Addressing the region’s vulnerabilities aside, 
the decision to focus on Bicol is due to the 
growing adoption and formalization of Bicol 
language and literature in educational spaces. 
Under the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 
1997,	indigenous	people	in	the	Philippines	are	
entitled to education in their mother tongue 
and with a lack of implementation by the state, 
this may be an opportunity to advance the 
educational and cultural needs of the Bicolano 
people. In addition, every October, the Ibalong 
Festival is held in Legazpi City where old folk 
epics but also the “people’s determination to 
survive the typhoons that strike their homeland 
annually” is celebrated - offering another 
opportunity to explore the role of cultural 
heritage in the dissemination of natural 
resource management education to the greater 
Filipinx public.
(Figure 12)
Project‘s conceptual framework 
with its interlinked thematic pillars. 
Original diagram from FAO, 2011, 
redrawn by author for legibility.
1 / ENABLE THE ENVIRONMENT
Institutional strengthening and 
good governance for DRR in all 
agricultural sectors
3 / APPLY PREVENTION AND
MITIGATION MEASURES
Promotion and diversification of 
livellihoods with risk reducing technologies, 
approachesand practices across all 
agricultural sectors
2 / WATCH TO SAFEGUARD
Information and early warning
systems on food and nutrition security
and transboundary threats
4 / PREPARE TO RESPOND
Preparedness for effective response and 







The Tiwi Geothermal Complex is located in 
Tiwi, Albay, Bicol on the northeast slope of 
potentially active Mount Malinao. The Tiwi 
field is the first geothermal area in the 
Philippines to be commercially developed on a 
large-scale basis (Camu & Santiago, 2000). This 
was also the first use of geothermal steam for 
power generation in the Philippines (Menzies et 
al, 2010).
In	1971,	the	National	Power	Corporation	(NPC)	
and Chevron Geothermal Philippines Holdings 
(CGPHI) (a subsidiary of the Union Oil Company 
of California) joined forces to develop 
geothermal resources in Tiwi and explore the 
resource in the area. The first deep discovery 
well, Naglagbong-1, was drilled from March 
to	June	1972	and	eventually	led	to	a	55	MW	
generation	unit	in	January	1979	due	to	its	
successful demonstration of the resource’s 
commercial viability (Menzies et al, 2010). By 
May of that year, 45 wells were drilled and the 
NPC (the entity tasked to ‘construct, operate 
and maintain facilities for the production of 
electricity’	since	1936)	assumed	control	of	
the entire Tiwi prospect area (approximately 
17,661 hectares and outlined in Figure 11 
above) for commercial electricity generation. 
The environmental and social impact of the 
Tiwi Geothermal Complex, like other geothermal 
projects, are primarily described as savings 






























The complex has a total installed capacity of 
334 MW, and marks itself as one of the six 
large scale geothermal energy projects during 
this time. The operation provides an average 
157 MW (almost half of its capacity) to support 
the Luzon grid (the country’s largest and most 
populous island, and home to the country’s 
metropolitan center Manila) and has offset 
80.6 million barrels of oil imports since its 
opening in the first 30 years of its operation 
(Menzies et al, 2010).
Since	1979,	the	plant	has	experienced	its	share	
of challenges: Prior to extensive typhoon 
damage in 2016, the plant was underperforming 
due to a lack of steam (reportedly decreasing 
at a rate of 8-10% per year). In 2004-
2005, four of the units were rehabilitated 
and installed capacity was re-rated to 234 
MW⸺retiring	Unit	4	in	2000	and	designating	Unit	
3 as a stand-by unit in 2005. The start of the 
Wholesale Electricity Spot Market (WESM), which 
changed units to be used as “load following” 
rather than “base load” plants also compromised 
performance. In 2008, two new production wells 
were installed improving the plant’s capacity 
but also revealed that additional reserves may 
exist in the region (south and southwest of 
the Kapipihan and Bariis fields (see Figure 
13 above), providing a lifeline to extend the 
plant’s viability.
Ownership of the plant was privatized and 
awarded to winning bidder, Aboitiz Power 
Renewables,	Inc	(APRI)	formally	on	May	25,	2009	
and continues to collaborate with CGPHI.
(Figure 14)























TIWI, ON THE GROUND
The above and following Google street view 
images are shared to illustrate the spatial 
conditions of the geothermal energy plant that 
is not immediately apparent when analyzing the 
area from the limited planometric perspectives 
of satellite imagery, field exploration maps, 
and land use maps utilized in this study. 
Due to limitations of the study and travel 
restrictions	still	in	place	from	the	COVID-19	
pandemic, meaningful ethnographic and field 
research were not employed in this research 
and therefore, observations are made from 
historically informed speculation but also the 
lived experience of the researcher’s family 
who have lived “sa provinsya,” translated as 
“in the provinces” meaning the countryside or 
rural, non-urban territories of the country.
Active volcanoes in the Bicol Region and number 
of historic eruptions (Sigurdsson 
et al, 2000): 
MOUNT IRIGA (Camarines Sur), 2
MOUNT MAYON (Albay), 45
MOUNT BULUSAN (Sorsogon), 12
(Figure 15)
(Figure 16, right)
Gated and secured entrance of the Tiwi 
Geothermal administrative buildings.
(Figure 17, right)
One of three (3) plants on the northeast

























Initial observations reveal that residential 
developments living immediately adjacent 
to a commercial plant of this scale is 
relatively unique to the Philippines, Mexico 
and Indonesia, compared to its Global North 
counterparts of top geothermal energy producing 
countries. Plants like the Geysers Complex and 
CalEnergy Geothermal Plants in California, 
or the Larderello Geothermal Complex in 
Italy (recall Figure 3 in Chapter 1) are 
surrounded too by forest and parkland area, but 
residential settlements are further located 
from its immediate territory.
(Figure 20-22, right)
Geothermal plants running through 
residential areas of the Tiwi municipality























Roads run alongside the pipes (suitable for 
service vehicles and transport needs) hug both 
farmland and forest area, appearing mostly as a 
two-way but sometimes narrowing to only fit one 
(1) vehicle as you follow the system further 
upland on Mount Malinao.
(Figure 23-24)






















These photos are not nearly sufficient without 
consulting the lived experiences of the 
residents in Tiwi, but offer a window into 
how public space is shared between residents 
and the industry the area is supporting———
bringing questions of its subsequent impacts on 
livelihoods and living conditions historically 
for the region.
Clues from signage begin to reveal what 
dangers the people of Tiwi, which comprises 25 
barangays and is home to 53,120 people (only 
4% of Albay’s 1.3 million population) may have 
grown to be neighbours with: high pressure 
steam that could escape should the pipe get 
damaged and tenuous roads with no street 
lights or barriers; making the area vulnerable 
at times of flooding, landslides and heavy 
rainfall during extreme weather events.
Whereas signage of slope grade (at 16% in 
the figure to the right), evade the present-
day government policy indicating land over 
18 degrees in slope with or without trees 
are “public forest land” and falls under the 
jurisdiction of the Forest Management Bureau 
(FMB) of the DENR. This policy thereby marks 
any upland inhabitants as “squatters” in the 
eyes	of	the	law	(Eder,	1994).
(Figure 25-26)
























The transnational indigenous rights movement, 
defined and supported by institutions like 
the United Nations and the World Bank (among 
other NGOs), has led to laws that grant special 
recognition and rights to indigenous people in 
settler-colonial societies (like Australia and 
Canada where the settler/aboriginal distinction 
is more clear) but also post-colonial nations 
like the Philippines (Theriault, 2011). These 
vary depending on national and historical 
context but for the Philippines is a response 
to post-authoritarian governments.
Only in the past few decades has conserving 
protected areas been seen as a vital strategy 
for safeguarding biodiversity but has been 
criticized due to the historic mismanagement 
of local development needs (i.e. displacing 
homes and livelihoods) (Major et al., 2018). 
This reiterates the need (and failure) of 
development in these areas to serve and support 
the livelihoods of people who occupy or live 
near them, while furthering  conservation 
efforts.
In	1978,	Presidential	Decree	1586	(PD	1586)	
which established the Philippines Environmental 
Impact Statement System (PEISS) and management 
related measures to “attain and maintain a 
rational and olderly balance between socio-
economic growth and environmental protections.” 
Within PEISS, a “social acceptability” 
component is formally defined, forcing projects 
to address public sentiments and ensure the 
conduct of public consultations over resolution 
of issues and conflicts. Failure to comply 
or inability to achieve social acceptability 
can cause an approval or denial of an 
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC): the 
documentation needed to proceed with geothermal 
energy	development	projects.	By	1996,	social	
acceptability was formally adopted into the 
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the DENR 
Administrative	Order	of	1996-37	of	1992.	DAO	
1996-37	defines	‘social	acceptability’	as,
“the result of a process mutually agreed upon by 
the DENR, key stakeholders, and the proponent 
to ensure that the valid and relevant concerns of 
stakeholders, including affected communities, are 
fully considered and/or resolved in the decision-
making process for granting or denying the 
issuance of an ECC.” 
Aimed to enhance public engagement in the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) process 
and asserts that EIS’ must be based on informed 
public participation and a result of meaningful 
engagement. This process is thereby required to 
encompass the full scope of the EIA project.
At 30 years of the Tiwi Geothermal Field’s 
commercial operations, Chevron Geothermal 
Philippine Holdings, Inc presented their report 
at the 2010 proceedings of the World Geothermal 
Congress that took place in April 2010 in 
Bali, Indonesia. The report only shares the 
limitations, challenges and actions made in 
managing the plant over its lifetime. 10 years 
prior, the NPC presented at the same World 
Geothermal Congress proceedings, this time in 
Japan in June 2000 reporting, 
“The Tiwi field is the first geothermal 
area in the Philippines to be 
commercially developed on a large-
scale basis. The project started in 
1972, prior to the onset of regulatory 
requirements on environmental and 
social aspects. Hence, due to the 
absence of such framework, the early 
years of geothermal exploration, 
development and operation were 
beset with problems. Community 
rallies and rift with the regulating 
agencies and the local government 
haunted the National Power 
Corporation (NPC) during its first 
10 years of operation. Though NPC 
was government-owned and the 
geothermal resource was a timely 
answer to the country’s oil crisis, the 
project lacked social acceptability.” 
(Camu & Santiago, 2000)
Camu and Santiago (2000) of NPC continue that 
benefits from such projects are,
“mostly discussed in terms of savings 
on oil imports and profit to the 
national economy… Technology helps 
mitigate and control environmental 
impacts, yet, it is not sufficient to 
appease people for the disturbance 
created by the project. Investors 
and economists see geothermal 
development in terms of profit 
and progress. The locals see it as 
exploitation of their environment and 
threat to their livelihood and peaceful 
41
(Figure 27)
A young child walking alongside a large commercial, above-ground geothermal pipe transferring high pressure steam to support the Luzon grid. Source: Google Maps Streerview
(Figure 28)
Architectural rendering of a road (location unknown) made by the ARUP group, one of the three entities selected for two of the three major packages under the Infrastructure Preparation 
and Innovation Facility (IPIF) Output 1 (9 projects) – Roads and Bridges and Output 3 (13 projects)– Transportation, boasting a total project cost of $174.7 billion USD
life. Community acceptance is a 
major challenge to any geothermal 
project. Hence, Tiwi’s experience is 
worth sharing to other areas and 
countries with potential for, or ongoing 
geothermal resource development.”
The report is clear to outline that drilling 
activities began in Tiwi, “the same year that 
Martial Law was declared in the country… 
[and] Mitsui and Co., Ltd. of Japan was NPC’s 
contractor for the electromechanical works 
while F.F. Cruz of the Philippines provided the 
civil and architectural works for the power 
plants (Camu & Santiago, 2000).” They cite an 
earlier	1988	study,	a	thesis	by	N.B.	Binalla	
on The Effects of Geothermal Power Plant 
Project in Tiwi, Albay presented to Aquinas 
University’s Graduate School in Legazpi City 
who reports, 
“[T]he negative perceptions of the 
residents to pollution and ecological 
disturbance, NPC’s exercise of the 
government’s power of eminent 
domain or acquisition of private lands 
for public use, and the lack of benefits 
to compensate for the disturbance 
created by the project. The 
consumers’ electric bills were costly, 
though the geothermal resource 
generating the electric power was only 
within the area. The place also lost 
its hot springs and the Naglagbong 
Park, a tourist attraction for its 
boiling pools, that was damaged in a 
hydrothermal eruption.”
This reveals the realities, and growing pains 
posed by geothermal energy development felt 
in the past by residents, but there has been 
no recent public studies since. One can only 
speculate that with the continued disasters 
that destroy billions in crops and  the 
changing landscape for farmers across the 
country, concerns or even motivations to 
migrate elsewhere may become more pressing. 
In the 2010 census, 1.4 million people in the 
Philippines moved to a different province, with 
half of this number moving to either Calabarzon 
(Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon) 
or the National Capital Region (NCR).
DEFINING THE “VALUE” OF LAND
“...rhetorics of sustainability are 
supported by late liberal and market 
embodiments that permit the 
hierarchization of instances of human 
and nonhuman life, and normalize 
the loss of some lives and ways of life 
as intrinsic to the process of what we 
call ‘progress.’”
— Ann M. Iwashita, Professor of Anthropology at the 
University of Hawaii in Hilo
Micropolitical ecology aspires to disentangle 
‘resource conflicts within and between 
communities, and between communities and the 
state, while analyzing these tensions within 
their broader historical, social and politico-
economic context’ (Horowitz, 2008). Thereby 
making micropolitical ecology a tool for 
revealing unacknowledged parallels between 
resource conflicts in the global North and 
South (Theriault, 2011). I argue that the 
tension between development terminology like 
preservation, conservation, progress and 
resilience highlight the competing developing 
drivers that (if not carefully managed) can 
result in “environmental stalemates” from 
an inability to find consensus for projects 
pushing forward sustainable innovation.
In legal terms, two key laws show this 
condition: the NIPAS Act and IPRA Act. The 
National Integrated Protected Areas System 
(NIPAS) Act seeks to “conserve biodiversity 
through protected areas, but on the condition 
that indigenous peoples can continue to live 
and extract resources within park boundaries, 
and participate in park management.” Whereas, 
the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (RA 8371) 
allows indigenous people to hold collective 
legal title to their territories, called 
‘ancestral domains’ and protects them from 
displacement by outside activities. This 
contradiction and overlap with other state-
sanctioned activities———such as The Mayon 
Volcano Ecotourism Project, established at the 
beginning of the 21st century where ecotourism 
development in relation to the Philippines 
volcanoes and the national park system was 
established (Erfurt-Cooper & Cooper, 2010)———
muddle the process, privilege those strategic 
in leveraging the appropriate act to serve 
their development, and ultimately serve as yet 
another barrier for meaningful intervention 























• Bicol  is a site overdue for environmental justice
• The region‘s agricultural  lands are impacted by climate change and extreme weather events
• Tiwi was met with community opposition in first 10 years of its operation
• Additional reserves in the area are being tapped to extend the plant‘s viability
• The scale of Tiwi is overbearing and out of scale to its adjacent neighborhood, street infrastructure privileges industry over people
that these Western-modeled legal frameworks of 
land tenureship and management have continued 
to systematically disenfranchise those who rely 
on the land for subsistence: both indigenous 























































“DEFINING” THE INDIGENOUS FILIPINX
For the purpose of this research, I am careful 
to employ the same definition as James Eder 
(1994)	by	the	Episcopal	Commission	for	Tribal	
Filipinos (ECTF), where the “ECTF estimates 
that there are approximately 6.5 million 
indigenous peoples, composing about 10 percent 
of the total Philippine population and 
belonging to over 40 distinct ethnolinguistic 
groups, which can be grouped in the following 
fashion:
the Lumad of Mindanao, various 
non-Muslim tribal peoples found in 
virtually every province of Mindanao, 
numbering around 2.1 million people 
and including such groups as the 
T‘Boli, the Manobo, the Mandaya, the 
Subanun, the Tiruray, the Bagobo, and 
the B’laan;
the Peoples of the Cordillera, 
indigenous inhabitants of the five 
provinces of the Cordillera mountain 
range of Northern Luzon, numbering 
around 1 million people and including 
such groups as the Ifugao, Bontoc, 
Kalinga, Isneg, Ibaloy, Tinngguian, and 
Kankaney; and
various other, widely scattered tribal 
peoples of the hinterlands of Central 
and Southern Luzon, some islands in 
the Visayas, Mindoro, and Palawan, 
and including the various “Negrito” 
groups (Dumagat, Agta, Batak, etc.), the 
various Mangyan groups, the Tagbanua, 
and the Pala‘wan.”
According	to	Eder	(1994),	“In	some	parts	of	
the country, intermarriage between Tribal 
Filipinos and lowland Filipinos and, as 
suggested above, the length of residence of at 
least some “lowland” Filipinos in hinterland 
areas are factors confounding efforts to 
specify unambiguously who is and who is not 
an “indigenous Filipino.” The third group and 
last point I contend is where the Bicol region 
falls within———particularly with the region’s 
distinct use and aims to preserve the Bicolano 
language and traditional culture, historic 
intermarriage during early Spanish colonial 
settlements, and displacement of original 
inhabitants to the uplands to make space for 
their colonizers near the ports and lowlands.
In the Philippines, indigenous peoples are 
understood as “peoples having a historical 
continuity with the archipelago’s pre-Islamic 
and pre-Hispanic society” (Holden, 2013). When 
Islam was introduced in the fourteenth century, 
those who resisted retreated to upland areas 
and when Spain introduced Christianity in the 
sixteenth century, these groups retreated 
even further upland so as to resist the 
Spanish. This act of self-preservation thereby 
correlates with the religious geographies of 
the Philippines that indigenous peoples tend to 
occupy mountainous and upland areas. As Spanish 
missionaries began to settle in the region, 
Catholicism and churches became central in 
Bicol villages and due to the region’s strong 
rice production capability, its lowlands were 
exploited under Spanish rule———ultimately 
leading to a restlessness and widespread 
rebellion	in	1649.	
Present government policy outlines that land 
over 18 degrees in slope with or without trees 
are “public forest land” and falls under the 
jurisdiction of the Forest Management Bureau 
(FMB) of the DENR, thereby marking any upland 
inhabitants as “squatters” in the eyes of the 
law	(Eder,	1994).
The historic process of acquiring a Certificate 
of Ancestral Land Claims (CALC) or Certificate 
of Ancestral Domains Claim (CADC) was 
burdensome to indigenous groups navigating the 
confusing jargon-filled legal forum that forced 
formalized discourse, and limited in scope as 
complained by indigenous groups. Proceedings 
primarily held in English and sometimes Tagalog 
demarcated language barriers, adding fuel to 
frustrations and debate that surely plagues 
groups going against gaslighting government 
agencies. But moreover, the act of providing 
“evidence” to “prove” one’s legitimacy in the 
Western construct of the court shows that this 
forum is not conducive to allowing other truth 
evaluation systems a.k.a indigenous ways of 
knowing.
MOVING BEYOND THE NARRATIVE
OF RESILIENCE
Resiliency is defined as the ability of groups 
or communities to adapt in the face of external 
social, political, or environmental stresses 
and disturbances (Adger, 2000). By this 
definition, indigenous peoples are among the 
most resilient groups in the world withstanding 
multiple and continued attempts at colonizing 
their traditional beliefs. Their participation 
as co-managers of protected areas in order to 
conserve both cultural and biological diversity 
is seen as essential  and applied in practice 
globally (Major et al, 2018). But despite their 
presence in movements related to logging, 
mining, dam construction, and the more recent 
negotiations regarding global climate change, 
indigenous peoples still absorb the brunt of 
so-called costs and benefits of development 
projects (Theriault, 2011).
But evidently, calls for external aid and 
institutional improvements from Philippine 
nationals and the global Filipinx diaspora 
during this year’s typhoon season prove that 
claims of Filipinxs preserving as they have 
always done each year, are just not enough 
anymore. Within the year of writing this 
thesis, the strongest storm of 2020 struck the 
Philippines reaching sustained winds of up to 
310	km	(195	miles)	per	hour	at	Super	Typhoon	
Goni’s (locally known as Typhoon Rolly) center. 
The center, just east of the shore of Bicol, 
impacted the island province of the region, 
Catanduanes, the hardest.
According to the Red Cross, the super typhoon 
damaged	90%	of	buildings	and	civil	defense	
officials estimated 370,000 people displaced. 
Goni is the most powerful storm to hit the 
country since 2013’s Typhoon Haiyan which 
killed more than 6,000 people. A BBC report on 
the storm the day after the event lists “ten 
people, including a five-year-old” to have died 
in Albay province… “Two drowned, another was 
swept away by volcanic mud and another killed 
by a falling tree.” 
The storm severed all access to electricity, 
water, and cellular networks on the island———
the entire Bicol region remained without 
electricity for at least 5 days after. Thereby 
forcing hundreds of thousands of people to 
evacuation	centers	amidst	the	ongoing	COVID-19	
global pandemic. Due to storm damage, power 
distribution lines were destroyed and an 
estimated 500 linemen needed to be sent to 
the Bicol region to do so. The Department 
of Energy “targeted” Christmas as the date 
that Catanduanes Island would be restored 
(Figure 32)






















100% of its power, delays caused by the need 
to purchase equipment first so that when 
workers migrating from other regions of the 
country arrive, there would be supplies ready. 
Presidential Spokesman Harry Roque assured 
Filipinxs that there will be partial power of 
course:
“Magkakaroon naman ng partial, 
huwag kayo mag-alala, partial naman 
po ma-rerestore yan. Hindi naman 
ibig sabihin dalawang buwan kayong 
walang kuryente.”
(Translation: There will be partial power, 
don’t worry. It doesn’t mean you will endure 
two months without electricity.)
DOE Undersecretary Wimpy Fuentebella reiterated 
that alternative sources of energy would also 
be employed as the DOE is now looking for 
operators of a diesel plant and hydro power 
plant in the area, as well as buying more 
petroleum and diesel supplies to satiate the 
interim.
(Figure 33)
Sketches by landscape architect Paul Acazaren in 2011 after Typhoon Ondoy (Rappler, 2020)
(RE)BUILD	(RE)BUILD	(RE)BUILD: 
THE DISASTER DEBT TRAP
With the total cost of infrastructure damage 
is estimated to be over $280 million and 
unmet calls on the government to reconfigure 
the budget to help Filipinxs back on their 
feet from an already depleted disaster 
fund, the Philippines falls into its cycle 
of relying on foreign aid (both formal and 
informal through remittances from emigrated 
Filipinx nationals) to fill the gap. The Bicol 
provincial government reports PHP 1.4 billion 
(approximately	$29	million	USD)	in	damage	to	
agricultural lands, with its main crop abaca 
at	92%	of	these	losses———impacting	20,000	
hectares of crops and thus 20,000 farmers. 
For the Future, a grassroots transnational 
organization of twelve (12) young Filipinos 
under 26 from Manila and New York, were among 
the several advocacy groups that called mass 
media to, “Change your headlines. It is not 
‘Filipino resiliency’” (anymore). Their public 
call to action for immediate direct money 
transfer donations for typhoon relief posted on 
Instagram on November 2nd, 2020 (the day after 
the storm), quotes a TEDx talk by Issa Barte on 
Filipinx resiliency:
“No one can doubt the resiliency of 
the Filipino. It’s been tried, tested 
and worn down since anyone can 
remember.
But this beacon of misconstrued 
hope that we can always rise again 
should not only tell you the story of 
how we can withstand suffering, but of 
how we deserve more. These headlines 
of our smiling kababayans reaching 
out through floods or storms should 
not only speak of their endurance, 
but of the things that put them in that 
position in the first place.
Our ability to withstand the worst 
should not only be a beacon of 
strength, but a narrative to question 
who’s putting us in this position to 
have to be resilient in the first place.
People can’t focus on prospering 
when they’re focused on surviving.”
 
In another post on November 12th, 2020, the For 
the Future team highlights the shared reality 
of many Filipinxs whose emigration story is 
rooted in escaping the dire conditions that 
still plague the nation:
“They were vulnerable before the 
storms came.
We deserve better than to be 
celebrated for going through the 
worst.
We deserve to prosper. Not just 
survive.”
The above highlights the systemic ways that 
the reactive nature of constantly rebuilding 
after disaster continues to act as a barrier 
for meaningful improvements in the livelihoods 
of the most poor in the Philippines, exposing 
opportunities for disaster capitalism to take 
hold. Disaster capitalism, where the fear 
of disaster is exploited to facilitate the 
entry of a capitalist project, perhaps being 
reflected in current Duterte administration’s 
ironfist approach on infrastructure development 
through their “Build Build Build” (BBB) program 
that pushes for dispersing economic activities 
in the countryside so as to address the skewed 
development and its associated congestion / 
traffic issues from urban centres like Metro 
Manila. With a portfolio of 20,000 proposed 
infrastructure projects that include roads, 
highways, farm-to-market roads, airports, 
seaports, terminals, evacuation centres, 
lighthouses, hospitals, schools, government 
centres and more, the program is a top priority 
of the Duterte administration and claims the 
highest budget allocation for infrastructure in 
all of Philippine history (Malindog-Uy, 2020). 
Despite challenges of lockdown and quarantine 
measures	from	COVID-19,	flagship	infrastructure	
projects continue to be completed including 
4,536 flood mitigation structures to expand 
protected flood-prone areas and 82 evacuation 
centers (built by the Department of Public 
Works and Highways, DPWH) in 52 provinces (with 
55 more underway). But the rapid nature of BBB 
is understood through its improvements towards 
developing “land, air, sea, and inter-island 
connectivity and mobility” with its 121 airport 
projects,	369	commercial,	social,	and	tourism	

























Renderings of Philippine infrastructure projects  from the ARUP Group
THE LAND GRAB OF INFRASTRUCTURE 




gases and geothermal energy resources belong 
to the state and under this law, enables the 
government to set aside or reserve lands as 
geothermal reservations upon the successful 
exploration that “indigenous” energy sources 
are available for utilization. A succeeding 
Presidential Decree (PD 1442) that same year, 
goes on to outline that, 
‘the Government may directly explore for, exploit 
and develop geothermal resources. It may also 
indirectly undertake the same under service 
contracts awarded through public bidding or 
concluded through negotiation, with a domestic 
or foreign contractor who must be technically 
and financially capable of undertaking the 
operations required in the service contract.‘
Meaning, that the state maintains ownership 
but can award the contract to a developer 
with a share breakdown of 60-40 for the state 
and contractor respectively - under contracts 
for 25 years, and extendable for another 15. 
In	1978,	another	contract	law	(PD	1442),	the	
Geothermal Service Contract Law, further 
outlines the terms for joint undertakings for 
the government and private entities interested 
in investing; but all failed to attract 
private investments due to their unfavourable 
incentives and heavy tax burdens on the private 
entity.
In the case of the Tiwi Geothermal Field, the 
environmental policies that added layers of 
due diligence for development projects came 
too late with systems like the Philippines 
Environmental Impact Statement System (PEISS) 
that rationalized the balance between socio-
economic growth and environmental protections 
established as construction was already nearing 
completion and operations to soon begin of this 
first geothermal plant in the Philippines.
The aggressive exploration undertaken by the 
Marcos regime was immediately stagnated with 
the entry of new administration, likely taking 
a conservative approach to development so as 
to begin assessing the real impact of the late 
dictator’s authoritarian rule. By the EDSA 
People Power Revolution, the NPC had already 
accrued billions in debt, prompting actions 
like the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law 
that divested NPC of the monopoly to control 
power generation in the country but also 
established a wider privatization process. EO 
215, along with RA 7718 marked the second wave 
of geothermal energy development allowing the 
private sector to more enticingly engage in BOT 
contracts without increasing national debt.
In	1987	post	successful	outsing	of	the	Marcos	
regime and entry of the country’s first woman 
president marking a new more positive era in 
the Philippines, Article XII, Section 2 in the 
Constitution outlines that,
‘All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, 
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces 
of potential energy, fisheries, forest or timber, 
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural 
resources are owned by the State‘
‘The exploration, development, and utilisation of 
natural resources shall be under the full control 
and supervision of the State. The state may 
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter 
into co-production, joint venture or production 
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or 
corporations or associations at least sixty (60) 
per centum of whose capital is owned by such 
citizens.
Showing that despite a change in administration 
and renewed commitment to the sanctity of 
democracy and well-being of the Filipinx 
people, the state still retains its control 
over the lands both developed by the Marcos 
administration and those under ‘public’ 
purview.
By	1992,	the	National	Integrated	Protected	
Areas Systems (NIPAS) Act outlined that any 
survey for energy resources in protected 
areas may be limited to exploration for 
data gathering purposes only, and that any 
exploitation or utilization of the resources 
found in these zones need to be passed 
through Congress. Despite formal adoptions to 
integrate more public engagement prior to such 
development, for the Tiwi Geothermal Plant, the 
damage or in this case development has already 
been done.
In	2001,	RA	9136	or	the	Electric	Power	Industry	
Reform Act (EPIRA) sought to liberalize the 
electricity market and restructure the sector, 
a direct response to the high electricity price 
rates being experienced by the country due to 
insufficient fuel reserves. This deregulation 
of the industry aimed to ensure affordable and 
reliable electric power through a “competitive, 
efficient, and market-based regulatory 
framework”⸺reinforcing	the	capitalist,	
neoliberal narrative to push towards the 

























“There is a critical difference between 
going through the empty ritual of 
participation and having the real power 
needed to affect the outcome of the 
process. [...] [w]ithout redistribution of 
power [participation] is an empty and 
frustrating process for the powerless. It 
allows the powerholders to claim all sides 
were considered, but makes it possible 
for only some [...] to benefit” (Minter et al, 
2014)
Through the review of energy policy in the 
country, critiques of acts like NIPAS are 
riddled with its lack of enforcement and 
muddled, overlapping jurisdictions that make 
it difficult to navigate acquiring the right 
protections within the state-defined legal 
framework (modeled after the US) for indigenous 
populations, subsistence farmers and long time 
occupants of the land. The need to prove with 
“evidence” their rights to the land can be a 
barrier enough to stifle opposition against 
any proposed development and even if proper 
documentation was acquired, history proves 
that plans may continue anyways, no matter the 
monetary and human cost.
In	1993,	land	disputes	over	a	rocky	118-hectare	
parcel on the hillside land outside of Cebu 
City	pitted	349	subsistence	farmers	that	
claimed to have occupied the land to grow corn 
since	the	late	1930s	against	Aznar	Enterprises,	
Inc and the Santa Lucia Realty Development 
Corporation who sought to develop the land 
for upper-class residences and a golf course 
(Eder,	1994).	Eder	reports	that	the	farmers	
claimed to qualify to receive land titles 
under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT), a 
Marcos-era land reform program created under 
PD 27, but was stifled by relevant government 
agencies (the Department of Agrarian Reform, 
DAR, and the Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources) who were under pressure 
from business interests. Development proceeded 
(incremental clearing of the disputed 
area) despite active court injunctions and 
restraining orders by the farmers (assisted 
by local NGOs) and Aznar-St. Lucia group’s 
lack of legally-required permits from DAR and 
DENR. When two farmers were shot and murdered 
on	June	7,	1993,	it	was	widely	believed	to	
be a representation of how intimidation and 
violence escalated at the site———unfortunately 
not the only incidence when it comes to past 
and ongoing land disputes in the country (Eder, 
1994).
The story of these farmers is mirrored by 
indigenous land claims to ancestral lands, both 
in past and present. 
Earlier studies into the limits of indigenous 
participation, such as the Agta and the 
Northern Sierra Madre Natural Park———
the Philippines’ largest protected area, 
demonstrate that “formalizing indigenous 
participation in protected area management 
is not enough to break through existing 
power structures that inhibit marginalized 
stakeholders to defense of their interests 
in natural resources against those of more 
powerful actors” (Minter et al, 2014).
The Lumad people, the indigenous groups of the 
Mindanao region in Southern People are among 
the most vocal, thereby most reported and in 
turn, most threatened———at present, there are 
international humanitarian calls to “Free the 
Lumad 26,” calling for the immediate release 






















elders and tribal leaders after a violent raid 
and illegal arrest at the Bakwit (Evacuation) 
School at the University of San Carlos, 
Talamban Campus in Cebu City on February 15th, 
2021. The Liyang Network, a “local to global 
advocacy network for environmental and human 
rights defenders in the struggle for land, 
livelihood & self-determination,” writes,
“Lumad communities have drawn 
international attention for their 
culturally-responsive, progressive 
schools that once could be found 
in over 200 communities across 
Mindanao (178 out of 215 have been 
forcibly closed.
Lumad schools empower students to 
think critically and assert their rights, 
develop their economies through 
sustainable agriculture and holistic 
health, and to defend their ancestral 
lands. Lumad schools pose a threat to 
the Duterte Regime’s neoliberal plans 
for the plunder of Mindanao’s last 
protected forests and waters.”
They continue,
“After numerous drone surveillance 
incidents, illegal entry by intelligence, 
threats, and intimidation of students 
and families by state agents, the 
Lumad School CTCSM received a 
closure order in May 2020.
Lumad schools have become both 
a symbol and a model for the just 
opposition of the marginalized. 
Desperate to discredit this, the NTF-
ELCAC [the National Task Force 
to End Local Communist Armed 
Conflict], funded by tax dollars, 
spreads misinformation through social 
media pages, press conferences, 
and public posters, about Lumad 
schools as “training grounds for child 
warriors,” charging teachers with 
human trafficking, child abuse, and 
kidnapping charges. The state tries to 
attack the schools’ legitimacy despite 
the fact that they are accredited 
by the Department of Education 
and legally permitted to operate as 
alternative learning systems.”
These stories that share state-sanctioned 
acts of violence and manipulation of legal 
frameworks feel repetitive to disclose but 
only further prove the continued attack 
on any threat of dissent of the standing 
administration, worryingly reminiscent of 
the tales of Marcos shared in Chapter 1. 
Raymond L. Bryant (2002) draws from Foucaldian 
literature’s theories of ‘governmentality’ 
to argue that non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) that promote biodiversity conservation 
agendas ultimately share a common underlying 
purpose: “persuading indigenous people to 
internalize state control through self-
regulation”———highlighting the conflict even 
when “aid” has come to some form of rescue.
USING INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE FOR 
CLIMATE ADAPTATION
In present-day academia, supported by the 
widening global reckoning that indeed, 
maybe indigenous people knew and hold the 
key to climate adaptation solutions after 
all, unfortunately seem to still centre the 
practitioner or researcher who was “smart 
enough” to point out that maybe this “low 
tech” was the simple innovation we were looking 
for in this costly need for the newest, most 
technologically-advanced solutions. 
Academics have gone as far as defining “radical 
indigenism,” a term originally theorized by 
Eva Marie Garroutte (a research associate 
professor at Boston College and enrolled 
citizen of the Cherokee Nation) and made 
popular by newer books like “Lo-TEK: Design by 
Radical	Indigenism”	by	Julia	Watson	(2019).	The	
distinction of “radical” (derived from Latin 
radix, meaning “root”) as Garroutte describes, 
“illuminates differences in assumptions about 
knowledge that are at the root of the dominant 
culture’s misunderstanding and subordination of 
indigenous knowledge... (Thereby arguing for 
the) reassertion and rebuilding of knowledge 
from those roots” (Garroutte, 2018). And 
though sensitivity has been promised in ways 
of representing the knowledge and stories of 
highlighted indigenous groups, the extraction 
of this knowledge and lack of long-term 
partnership or relationship established with 
the groups reveal the privileges of the Global 
North to divert from any real ownership and 
responsibility for the root of this problem.
When speaking about the climate justice 
movement (CJM), a central issue raised is 
climate debt———the ecological debt defined by 
the unjust power relation between the Global 
North and South (Warlenius, 2018). This is 
further articulated by Patrick Bond (2014), 
reinforcing that “peasants, indigenous peoples, 
and women” are among the groups who have been 
disproportionately affected and hold the least 
responsibility for climate change:
“Climate justice is the recognition 
that the historical responsibility for 
the vast majority of greenhouse gas 
emissions lies with the industrialized 
countries of the global North.”
In other words, the burden of mitigation and 
adaptation costs is the responsibility of 
nations in the global North. 
Trends in the assertion of indigenous rights 
through this lens show promise to inspire new 
forms of collaboration, but share the threat to 
“bind indigenous movements into straightjackets 
of eco-authenticity” (Theriault, 2011). 
Theriault argues that both perspectives are 
needed to simultaneously consider and address 
official objectives, strategies and outcomes, 
but also the personal histories, interpersonal 
relationships and local struggles that animate 
[one’s] daily life. This tension is productive 
to think through a collective approach to 
accommodate differences whilst simultaneously 
contesting bases of structural subordination 
(Foster, 2002).
The institutionalization of ‘indigeneity’ by 
NGO advocacy and state policies creates a power 
imbalance, whether intentional or not, that 
can impose conceptual frameworks, economic 
interest, and (anti-)political agendas on the 
very people whose interests they aim to promote 
(Theriault, 2011). And though alliances are 
typically welcomed, Theriault (2011) aptly 
questions, “What then, do indigenous movements 
risk when they use the ideological and 
communicational infrastructure of globalization 
to assert their interests?” Washing over these 
strategies as simply ‘counterglobalization’ 
tactics flattens indigenous movements to a 
binary simplification that pits the choices 
between the environment and development, which 
I argue through the scope of a geothermal 
energy development projects, is insufficient 
and requires further nuanced understandings 
of the locally felt issues at hand. Stuart 
Kirsch (2007) highlights that indigeneity (as 
an ideological basis for collective action 
against corporations) imposes an unrealistic 
binary between economic development and 
environmental protection———the ‘risks of 
counterglobalization’———increasing the 
likelihood that the community in question will 
be left with neither.
The intentions of indigenous movements is 
often distorted to appear as an “all-or-
nothing” position with respect to development, 
as Noah Theriault describes when studying the 
micropolitics of indigenous environmental 
movements in the Philippines. They argue 
that “without attention to such local-level 
variation, we risk obscuring some of the most 
important motives and outcomes of indigenous 
movements”———specifically, “overlook[ing] the 
alternative visions of socio-environmental 
justice that emerge from their day-to-
























Pages from NinaValerie Kolowratnik‘s book, The Language of Secret Proof showing drawings with a careful notation system that “communicate[s] Native truths in a Western legal 
environment while respecting cultural secrecy and complying with its rules”
CONCLUSION + NEXT STEPS
It is difficult not to reflect on how the 
“growing pains” of accommodating the rapidly 
growing urban centres in the Philippines, 
feel reminiscent of the expansion of public 
works and highways here in the United States 
that violent displaced and removed Black and 
Brown communities to “clean” areas of “urban 
blight” for the sake of progress and modernity. 
Bringing justice to these past planning harms 
are undoubtedly still the most pressing call to 
action my planning generation shares.
In the case of geothermal energy development, 
I conclude that there is plenty of cause and 
evidence of the resource’s viability, but 
reckon the direct conflict with its overlap on 
ancestral lands and land holding the nation’s 
natural capital. 
The facts uncovered by this thesis are 
that for the Philippines, post-colonial 
legitimation drives and perhaps still drives 
infrastructure development; development 
that privileges the national narrative of 
“resiliency” and “progress” while prioritizing 
urban centres. And while opposition persists 
against certain development projects, land 
tenure claims are challenging to win due 
to the Western formalities and constructs 
that are privileged in such legal battles. 
We learned that the process, shortened and 
stifled by the limits of political campaigns 
and inconsistent recollection of institutional 
knowledge, ultimately does not give any real 
power to indigenous peoples when coming to 
a consensus in geothermal energy projects. 
The contradicting policies and convoluted 
development process make participation 
difficult, begging the question if the scale we 
undertake geothermal energy is appropriate and 
responsive to increasing need.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Limitations for indigenous participation are embedded within the system and do not actually transfer any power to indigenous 
peoples
• Providing “evidence” of ancestral land claims is limited in scope
• The experience of subsistence farmers opposing development or land encroachment (historic and present day) mirror the indigenous 
experience
• Projects push forward despite community opposition and public dissent, for the sake of “nation”
(Figure 37)






















In close, I offer starting points of further 
research that could advance the conversation 
attempted by this thesis through the following 
ideas:
RECOMMENDATION (1)
INVESTING AT THE BARANGAY
SCALE DIRECTLY
I think of the sketches publicly shared 
by landscape architect Paulo Alcazaren 11 
years ago, showing that ideas of simple but 
thoughtful designs can and have already 
been thought of———but just lack execution 
at the powers and funding at the hands of 
the barangays themselves to decide what is 
needed at times of crisis to help their fellow 
kababayan, or comrade.
(Figure 37)
Sketch underlay by Paul Alcazaren, annotations by author
RECOMMENDATION (2)
A COUNTERMAPPING EXERCISE TO DEFINE 
THE	VALUE	OF	“NATURAL	CAPITAL”	———
MOVING AWAY FROM WATSON’S APPROACH 
TO KOLOWARTNIK’S APPROACH
As we continue to look for solutions that 
integrate indigenous truths and knowledges 
for the collective, or use for the masses, 
questions of ethics and power dynamics must 
stay at the forefront of as practitioners in 
the built environment. I think of the CARE 
Principles for Indigenous Data Governance as 
a framework for the baseline of projects, 
recognizing the needed customization to respond 
to different communities’ data and privacy 
needs.
I also reflect on stories shared by Nina 
Valerie Kolowratnik in their book The Language 
of Secret Proof where she works with the Pueblo 
peoples to create a careful notation system so 
as to “communicate Native truths in a Western 
legal environment while respecting cultural 
secrecy and complying with its rules”———
thinking that this is a replicable process by 
the skills of an architect with the mindfulness 
of a planner to bring due diligence and 
perspective to centering a holistic approach 
to needs of said peoples. By decentering the 
technical expert and centering the authorship 
of indigenous peoples in their own knowledges, 
what would it look like to engage in a 
countermapping exercise to define natural 
























IMPROVING FACILITATION TOOLS AND 
EXPLORING RESPECTFUL WAYS OF 
REPRESENTATION, CENTERING THE CARE 
PRINCIPLES FOR DATA GOVERNANCE
As revealed in this thesis, policies are 
contradicting and the development process 
is convoluted, taken advantage of by those 
with the insight to navigate the bureaucracy 
of national legal frameworks———barriers for 
indigenous participation. 
I think of Vancouver-
based organization Drawing 
Change as an example 
of ways that graphic 
recorders can be engaged 
to facilitate and record 
meetings and workshops, a 
tool that could de-cloud 
the current process.
(Figure 38, below)




























resource assessment + 
development strategy
project EIA + EC
production / reinjection 
well drilling












































average well capacity = 5 MW 
/ well
production wells: 21
reinjection wells = 7
roads = 10 km, exploratory; 20 
km, development
ASSUMPTIONS
$50,000 =   EIA/Permits
$135,000 =   per km road
$458,000 =   drillpad
$2,100,000 =   well
$500,000 =   feasibility 
study
$135,000  =   EIA
$2,100,000 =   well
$11,860,000 =  roads + pads
$30,000,000 =  FCRS
$15,000,000 =  admin + overhead
























VISUALIZING THE PROCESS TO MAKE IT 
MORE ACCESSIBLE
Building on graphic recording and facilitation 
for project stakeholders, there is an 
opportunity to improve the public education of 
geothermal and renewable energy, particularly 
for the Tiwi Geothermal Complex. The services, 
training and public educational programming of 
the successful Cleanenergy Center, located at 
the MakBan geothermal site (also operated by 
Aboitz Power) should be mirrored in Tiwi, Albay 
for Bicol students and residents.
(Figure	39-40)

































SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE OF STAKEHOLDERS
(LOCAL	GOVERNMENT,	HOST













(Ratio et al, 2020)
BARRIERS TO INTRODUCING 
GEOTHERMAL POWER PLANTS 
IN THE PHILIPPINES
(Dolor, 2005)
Highlighted are stages 
that residents should be 























(Revised by author, 2021)
AREAS OF FOCUS TO IMPROVE 




























RELATED TO CLIMATE 
DISPLACEMENT +  DISASTER 
RECONSTRUCTION LABOUR
RECOMMENDATION	(5)
With the surge of employment 
opportunities in the construction 
of Duterte’s Build Build Build 
program, better understanding 
the needs of workers could 
identify opportunities to educate 
a workforce in the emerging 
renewable nergy industry, or 


























IDENTIFY STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN 
CULTURAL PRESERVATION AND EXISTING 
ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCACY EFFORTS
Under the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 
1997,	indigenous	people	in	the	Philippines	are	
entitled to education in their mother tongue 
and with a lack of implementation by the state, 
this may be an opportunity to advance the 
educational and cultural needs of the Bicolano 
people.
In addition, every October (the start of 
typhoon season), the Ibalong Festival is held 
in Legazpi City where old folk epics but also 
the “people’s determination to survive the 
typhoons that strike their homeland annually” 
is celebrated———offering another opportunity to 
explore the role of cultural heritage in the 
dissemination of natural resource management 
education to the greater Filipinx public.
Considering that development projects’ 
secondary goal of addressing the well-being of 
the Filipinx people has mostly failed and that 
many of the issues felt are shared on a global 
level, strategic alliances could create larger 
platforms to amplify calls to action that 
plague countries like the Philippines who are 
bombarded with hardship year in and out.
By exchanging strategies and sharing grievances 
across environmental defenders (joining 
subsistence farmers and indigenous peoples), 
the transnational Filipinx diaspora, and island 
geographies along the equator, perhaps global 
power dynamics in the race to mitigate climate 
change has a chance after all.
SUMMARY FINDINGS ACTION ITEMS
Infrastructure development privileges 
the country’s national narrative of 
“resiliency” and “progress” and prioritizes 
urban centers
Investment in infrastructure at the scale 
of the “barangay”
Land tenure claims privilege Western 
representations and constructs of knowledge
A countermapping exercise to define the 
value of “natural capital” ———moving away 
from Watson’s approach to Kolowartnik’s 
approach
• decentering the “expert”
• participatory planning
• equal partner in development
Participation ≠ power for indigenous people Improving facilitation tools and exploring 
respectful ways of representation, 
centering the CARE Principles for Data  
Governance 
Contradicting policies + convoluted 
development process
Visualizing the process to make the process 
more accessible
Development projects’ secondary goal of 
addressing the well-being of the Filipinx 
people has mostly failed
Better understanding inter province/island 
migration patterns related to climate 
displacement +  disaster / reconstruction 
labour
Issues are systemic on a shared global 
level
Identify strategic alliances in cultural
• preservation and existing 
environmental advocacy efforts
• Preservation of language
• Subsistence farmers
• Transnational Filipinx diaspora 
advocacy
• Climate change and island geographies
(Figure 42-43, back cover)
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